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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The City concurs in the Mayor's statement of the case.

None.

The City does not seek attorneys fees on appeal.

1.

ARTICLEVIII, 5 3's VOTINGREQUIREMENT
DOES NOT APPLYTO ORDINARY
AND
NECESSARY
EXPENSESTHATARISE IN THE ORDINARY ADMINISTRATION
OF LOCAL
GOVERNMENT
AFFAIRS.

This Court should affinn the District Court's holding because the City's obligations
under the Renewal Power Sales Agreement are ordinary and necessary expenses within the
meaning of Art. VIII,

5 3 of the Idaho Constitution, and therefore no authorizing vote is required.

That section provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
No city shall incur any indebtedness, or liability, in any manner, or
for any purpose, exceeding in that year, the income and revenue
provided for it for such year, without the assent of two-thirds of the
qualified electors thereof voting at an election to be held for that
purpose, nor unless provisions shall be made for the collection of
an annual tax sufficient to pay the interest on such indebtedness as
it falls due, and also to constitute a sinking fund for the payment of
the principal thereof . . . Any indebtedness or liability incurred
contrary to this provision shall be void: Provided, that this section
shall not be construed to apply to the ordinary and necessary
expenses authorized by the general laws of the state.. ..(emphasis
added).
In this case, the Mayor does not dispute the District Court's finding that the City's
obligations under the Renewal Power Sales Agreement are "ordinary" within the meaning of Art.

VIII,

5

3.1 Thus, the only issue before this Court is whether those obligations are "necessary."

The City asserts that its payment obligations under the Renewal Power Sales Agreement
constitute "ordinary and necessary expenses" within the meaning of the Constitution because
they arise in the ordinary course of local government affairs and submits that the present appeal
can be resolved by referring to the constitutional debates and the extensive case law regarding
the ordinary and necessary expense proviso within Art. VIII, 5 3.

B

DR~FTERS'
INTENTAND ART VIII, $ 3 3 PROVISOCLAUSE

The proceedings and debates of the ldaho Constitutional Convention of 1889 contain an
extensive discussion of local government finance and the purpose of Art. VIII,

5 3.

Those

proceedings show that although "[mJany convention delegates wanted to severely limit the
the drafters also recognized that the
ability of local governments to incur indebtednes~,"~
ongoing administration of local government and the need of local governments to fulfill statutory
duties and legal obligations required some flexibility in a local government's ability to incur debt
without submitting each potential obligation or expenditure to a vote.3
The initial draft of Art. VIII, 5 3 would have prohibited any municipal debt or obligation
which extended beyond one year without approval of two-thirds of the voters at a special
e l e ~ t i o nThe
. ~ delegates quickly realized that the original draft of Art. VIII,

5 3 "went

too far in

limiting local government."5 Recognizing that the strict voting requirements in the original text
1

Appellant's Brief, at 6.

2

Dennis C. Colson, Idaho's Constitution: The Tie that Binds 198 (1991)

3

For instance, Judge William Claggett expressed concern that Art. VIII, 5 3 as originally drafted - without
the proviso - would severely impede the "ordinary administration of [local government] affairs." I.W.
Hart, Proceedings andDebales of the Constitutional Convention of ldaho, 588 and 591 (1912); see also the
City's Brief to the District Court, dated March 17, 2009, at 5 A.I., pp. 19-20 (R. Vol. I1 at 552-53).

4

Colson, supra, at 198-99

5

Id. at 199.

of Art. V111,

5

3 would create an untenable situation for local governments, Judge William

Claggett, one of the most respected members of the convention, observed that the proposed debt
limitation would severely impede the "ordinary administration of [local govenment] affairs."6
He noted that:
[Ilf you pass that section in the way it is you will absolutely
require that when a witness wants to get his fees, after he has
attended upon the court, before he can do it the county
commissioners have got to stop and submit at a special election to
the whole vote of the people as to whether they will pay them or
n0t.7
To avoid this impractical and unrealistic state of affairs, he proposed the following
language:

"Provided, That this section shall not be construed to apply to any ordinary

indebtedness created under the general laws of the state."s~hedelegates' comments make clear
that this exception9 was a compromise intended to give governmental authorities the freedom to
incur indebtedness when necessary to the efficient administration of local government, while still
preserving the integrity of the Idaho Constitution's "spirit of economy."10 The delegates
recognized that the orderly and efficient administration of local government required that certain
debts-"ordinary

indebtedness" under Judge Claggett's proposal-be

requirements of Art. VIII,

5

exempt from' the voting

3. Judge CIaggett's comments provide a clear statement of the

intent of the drafters in inserting the proviso clause:

6

Elart, supra,. at 588.

7

Id.

8

Id. at 586.

9

This exception is referred to as the "proviso" clause. See City ofBoise v. Frazier, 143 Idaho 1, 3, 137 P.3d
388, 390 (2006).

lo

Id at 5, 137 P.3d at 392 (quoting Williams v. City ofEmmett, 51 Idaho 500, 505,6 P.2d 475,476 (193 1).

I simply call the attention of the convention to the fact that the way
it [Art. VIII, $ 31 reads now it would prohibit the issuance of
county scrip to pay the ordinary indebtedness absolutely imposed
upon the county as provided by law, in case there should be any
heavy expenses, as suggested by Mr. Hampton, exceeding the
current revenues of that year; and that if is intended to apply to
special indebtedness, I should judge.]]

I offered this proviso to call the attention of the convention to this
matter. We don't want to go over this too fast. For instance, the
general laws of the state will provide that the witness fees are so
much, the mileage fees are so much, all the expenses of the county
government are fixed by law. Those expenses are paid annually by
the issuance of county scrip, or paid as they arise by the issuance
of county scrip. We all know that in the practical administration of
county government, that there sometimes will be extraordinary
expenses, I mean extraordinary expenses in the ordinary
administration of affairs. I am not speaking now of special
indebtedness at all, but the ordinary general indebtedness which is
incurred in the way of administration of county affairs . . .[The
purpose of the proviso] is to limit the section [Art. VIII, 5 31 to
such indebtedness as does not arise under the ordinary
administration ofthe county.12
The delegates knew that in the "ordinary" course of affairs, local governments would
sometimes encounter "extraordinary" expenses that cumulatively exceeded the budget for the
current year.13 These "extraordinary expenses," which the Framers intended to be exempt from
the voting requirements, were separate from "special indebtedness," which all of the delegates
agreed required prior voter approval. Several of the delegates gave practical examples of the
type of extraordinary expenses that should not require a public vote. Delegate Weldon Heyburn
1

Hart, supra, at 587 (emphasis added).

l2

Id at 588-589 (emphasis added)

l3

As the City explained in its Brief to the District Court, Judge Claggett's statement about "extraordinary
expenses in the ordinary administration of county affairs ...." referred to expenses occurring within the
ordinary administration of county affairs which exceeded available revenues within a county's budget year.
In contrast, his reference Lo "special indebtedness" meant expenditures which are unusual, infrequent, and
not occurring in the customary administration of the county. See the City's Brief to the District Court at 5
111 A.l, at p. 20-21, and p. 21, footnote 25 (R. Vol. 11 at553-54).

noted that "[tlhe expenses of the crirninal court instead of being upon the litigants as in civil
cases are upon the county," and in the event of "an unusual number of capital cases," the
expenses could easily exceed the revenue allocated for criminal trials in a given year.14
Explaining why such expenses should not require a vote, Delegate Heyburn said "[wle don't
want to have any part of our court expenses in doubt . . . and we don't want to call a county
election for the purpose of making up a deficit of four or five hundred dollars at the end of the
year."l5

Delegate Peter Pefley, the mayor of Boise, gave another example of the type of

"ordinary and necessary'. maintenance expenditures that municipalities would periodically
encounter.
We have streams running adjacent through the city that in time of
high water, and ditches all the time, that are liable as I said to break
away and run down through the city, and if we had to wait to hold
an election and get two-thirds of the voters to ratify another levy,
the whole city might be ruined before it could be abated,and I
would not like to see anything of that kind occur.16
Importantly, the drafters' debates concerning the proviso clause focused on the ordinary
character of the municipal obligations, rather than any particular urgency driving the need for
the expenditure. The examples cited above show that the drafters intended that municipalities be
able to incur those obligations which were essential to the ordinary administration of
governmental affairs without an authorizing election and that Art. VIII,

5 3's voting requirement

was reserved for those expenditures which William Claggett referred to as "special

l4

Hart, supra, at 590-91
idar591.

l6

id at 592.

I7

id at 588-589.

c.

THE CHARACTER OF THE DEBT,NOT THE PRACTICALITY OF HOLDING
AN ELECTION,
DETERMINES
WHETHER
AN OBLIGATIONIS ORDINARY AND NECESSARX

It is clear from the constitutional convention that the drafters recognized that a certain
class of "ordinary" debt could properly be incurred regardless of the practicality of first
submitting the matter to the voters. This, ,of course, was the whole thrust behind the proviso
clause. The Framers understood that the voting requirement only applied to "such indebtedness
as does not arise under the ordinary administration of the [local government]."l8 Thus, the
analysis under the proviso clause depends on a finding that the character of the proposed
indebtedness is the type of debt that arises under the ordinary administration of local government
affairs,l9 or in other words, the obligation is essential to a local government's ability to fulfill its
customary or recurring governmental or proprietary functions.
The drafters did not intend that the proviso's applicability would depend on a finding that
it is impractical to hold an election. Perceptive observers then and now have recognized that
presenting every issue of multi-year municipal debt to the voters would be impractical and
completely unworkable.20 Delegate Weldon Weyburn noted that, "Elections are held in our
county at an expense of eight or nine hundred dollars - for the purpose of determining whether
or not you shall issue $500 worth of warrants - that is the practical application of the principle,
and it is hardly worthwhile to go to this expense."21 However, this discussion of practicality is
merely a by-product of the underlying ordinary and necessary analysis. Merely because it is
possible to delay an expenditure long enough to conduct a public vote does not necessarily mean
Is

Id (comments of William Claggett).

19

id

20

In a recent decision, Justice Jim Jones of the Idaho Supreme Court observed, with regard to the voter
approval requirement of Art. VIII 3, that "[llt is a virtual impossibility to present every multi-year
governmental contract or lease to the public for a vote." li2 re Universily Place/Idaho Water Center Project,
146 Idaho 527, 199 P.3d 102, 122 (2008) (J. Jones, J., specially concurring).

21

Hart, supra, at 591 (comments of Weldon Heyburn)

a city or county must do so. The Framers did not intend to tie local officials' hands to the point
where unsound or absurd results would follow. Rather the proviso was grounded in the need for
practicality in administering the ordinary affairs of local government.
Early Idaho case law similarly reflects the intent of the drafters that municipalities could
properly incur a certain class of routine debt necessary for the ordinary administration of
governmentaf affairs without first submitting the matter to the voters. In Butler v. City of
Lewiston,22 for instance, the Idaho Supreme Court upheld the issuance of bonds to fund the

payment of salaries of city officers and employees, "other necessary municipal expenses," and a
tort judgment against the city, finding that these were "ordinary and necessary expenses" within
the meaning of Art. VIII,

5 3.23

In H i c k e y v. C i t y of NampaF4 the Court held that bonds issued

to fund debts incurred to repair and replace a city's water system which had been destroyed by
fire, purchase firefighting equipment, pay the salaries of officers and pay other "necessary

expenditures in ihe m a i n t e n a n c e of the municipal government" were "ordinary and necessary
expenses" within the meaning of Art.VIE,

5 3.25

In Corum v. Common School Dist. No. 2 I z 6

the Court held that "[tlhe employment of teachers by trustees of common school districts was a
duty imposed upon them by law, and the cost thereof was an 'ordinary and necessary
expense' ...."27

Other Idaho cases also demonstrate that those debts which, by their character,

22

1 l ldaho 393,83 P. 234 (1905).

23

Id at 404, 83 P. at 238; see also the City's Brief to the District Court at 5 III.A.1, pp. 22-23 (R. V o l . I1 at
555-56).

24

22 Idaho 41, 124 P. 280 (1912).

25

id. at 43, 124 P. at 280 (emphasis added); see also the City's Brief t o the District Court at III.A.l, pp. 2324 (R. Vol. 11 at 556-57).

26

55 ldaho 725,47 P.2d 889 (1935)

27

Id at 730,47 P.2d at 891 (emphasis added); see also thc City's Brief to the District Court at $ IILC.?., p.
38 (R. Vol. I1 at 571).

a r e essential to the ongoing administration and maintenance of local g o v e r n m e n t and t h e
fulfillment of legal obligations are "ordinary and necessary expenses."28
011the other

hand, the Framers did intend Art. VIII, $ 3's voting requirement to apply to

what t h e y called "special indebtedness," meaning, as stated by Judge Claggett, those debts which

do not arise in the ordinary course of administering local government-in

other words, long-term

indebtedness issued o r incurred to finance large capital projects. Subsequent decisions

of the

Idaho S u p r e m e C o u r t reflect this intent, namely, Bannock County v. C Bunting & Co. (issuance

of warrants for t h e purchase of land for a courthouse must be submitted to a vote)?9 Dunbar

I,.

Board of Corn 'rs of Canyon County (construction of a bridge i s not "ordinary and necessarym),30
Asson v. City of Burley (contracts unconditionally obligating cities to pay debt issued to finance

the construction of nuclear power plants are not "ordinary and necessaryn).31
Determining w h a t constitutes an "ordinary and necessary" expense is necessarily a caseby-case, fact-specific analysis.32 The F r a m e r s but d i d no? articulate any particular f r a m e w o r k or

28

See Thomas v Glindeman, 33 Idaho 394, 195 P. 92 (1921) (snow and ice removal on public streets, and
police and fire protection) ,Jones v. Power Co., 27 Idaho 656, 150 P. 35 (1915) (construction of a. jail in a
newly created county), Bannock County v. Bunting, 4 Idaho 156, 37 P. 277 (1894) (acquisition of a
temporary jail), City of Pocatello v. Peterson, 93 Idaho 774, 473 P.2d 644 (1970) (repair, replacement and
expansion of existing municipal airport facilities determined to be unsound, inadequate and unsafe, Board
ofCounty C0mi.s o f Twin Falls County v. Idaho Health Facilities Authority, 96 Idaho 498, 531 F.2d 588
(1974) (improvements to hospital facilities to comply with state safety standards), Ray v. Nampa School
District #131, 120 Idaho 117, 814 P.2d 17 (1990) (employment contract with maintenance electrician for a
school district), Hanson v. City ofldaho Falls, 92 Idaho 512, 514, 446 P.2d 634, 636 (1968) (salaries of
public employees), and Loomis v. Cily of Hailey, I19 Idaho 434, 807 P.2d 1272 (1991) (repair and
replacement of system components of public works projects). See also the City's Brief to the District
Court at 5 IILA.2, pp. 27-28 and 5 III.C.3 (R. Vol. I1 at 560-61).

29

4 Idaho 156,37 P. 277 (1894)

30

5 Idaho 407,49 P. 409 (1897)

31

105 Idaho 432,670 P.2d 839 (1983).

32

The Court recognized this principle by its statement in City of Boise v. Frazier that "[wlhether a proposed
expenditure is ordinary and necessary depends on the surrounding circumstances of each case." 143 Idaho
at 7, 137 P.3d at 394.

litmus test with which to determine whether an expenditure was ordinary and necessary and thus
exempt from Art. VIII,

5

3. Several of the delegates gave examples of the types of projects

which would constitute "ordinary and necessary expenses,"33 but the Framers established no
bright line rule by which to measure such indebtedness. Consequently, early Supre~neCourt
case law quickly recognized that a determination of whether a given expense arises in the
ordinary administration of local government affairs-and

thus is ordinary and necessary-

necessarily requires a case-by-case analysis that takes into account all of the facts and
circumstances associated with the proposed indebtedness and the particular purpose for which
the debt will be used.
The following are examples of expenditures which, after a careful analysis of the facts
associated with the indebtedness, have been held by the Idaho Supreme Court lo be "ordinary
and necessary expenses":
e

Snow and ice removal on public streets, and police and fire protection34

c

Construction of a jail in a newly created county35

4

Repair, replacement and expansion of existing municipal airport facilities
determined to be unsound, inadequate and unsafe36

e

Improvements to hospital facilities to comply with state safety ~tandards3~

Hart, supra, at 584-94 (The delegates suggested that "heavy county expenses," "coult expenses," "any
emergency," "extraordinary expenses," "witness fees," "mileage fees," "repairing ditches and water courses
and any part of the ordinary legitimate expenses of running county government," would qualify as
"ordinary and necessary").
34

Thomas v. Glindeman. 33 Idaho 394, 195 P. 92 (1921).

35

Jones v. Power Co., 27 Idaho 656, 150 P. 35 (1915)

36

City ofPocatello v. Peterson, 93 Idaho 774,473 P.2d 644 (1970).

37

Board ofCounty Conz8rsof Twin Falls County v. Idaho Health Facilities Authorify, 96 Idaho 498,53 1 P.2d
588 (1974).

0

Contract to procure a school teacher and payment of the teacher's
Employment contract with maintenance electrician for a school district39
Salaries of public employees40
Replacement of water system41

0

Repair and replacement of system components of public works projects42

The case-by-case analysis which the Court has used to determine that these expenditures
were ordinary and necessary shows that, as the Framers intended, the character of the obligation
is the key factor in determining whether an expense arises in the ordinary administration of
government affairs and thus exempt from Art. VIII, § 3's voting requirements.

In City of Boise v. Frazier, the Court held that financing the construction of a new multilevel airport parking structure was not an ordinary and necessary expense.43 The Court noted in
Frazier that "urgency," compelled by the need to protect public safety can, in certain
circumsta:ces, make the expenditure necessary within the meaning of Art. VIII,

5 3.44 On the

facts before it, the Court appropriately found that construction of a new multi-level parking

38

Corum v. Common Schooi Dist No. 21,55 Idaho 725,47 P.2d 889 (1935).

39

Ray v. NampaSchool District #131, 120 Idaho 117,814 P.2d 17 (1990).

40

Butler v. City of Lewiston, 11 Idaho 393, 83 P. 234 (1905); Hickey v. City ofNampa, 22 Idaho 41, 124 P.
280 (1912); Hansoxv. City ofldaho Falls, 92 Idaho 512, 514,446 P.2d 634,636 (1968) ("One of the most
fundamental and necessary expenses of municipal government is that which is incurred in the provision of
adequate police protection for persons and property. Certainly it could not be argued in good faith that the
weekly or monthly compensation of municipal employees is not an ordinary and necessary expense within
the proviso of art. VIII, 5 3.").

41

Hickey v. City ofNampa, 22 Idaho 41, 124 P. 280 (1912).

42

Loomis v. City ofHailey, 119 Idaho 434,807 P.2d 1272 (1991).

43

143 Idaho 1, 137 P.3d 388 (2006).

44

Id. at 6-7. 137 P.3d at 393-394

garage was not urgent, and thus not necessary.45 However, the City submits that urgency is not
the litmus test for determining whether governmental obligations are ordinary and necessary.
In Frazier, the Court confirmed that "[wlhether a proposed expenditure is ordinary and
necessary depends on the surrounding circumstances of each case."46 This suggests that the
presence of urgency is not a bright-line rule applicable to all potential government expenses.
Rather the Court's statement shows that urgency is only one factor, among others, that could
satisfy the "necessary" prong. Importantly, Frazier did not overrule any of the Court's prior
decisions, nor did the Court suggest that the Frazier rule superseded any of the Court's prior Art.
VIII,

5

3 precedent. Thus, previous Idaho Supreme Court decisions interpreting Art. VIII,

53

continue to be instructive in discerning what constitutes an ordinary and necessary expense.
Importantly, the Court in Frazier specifically acknowledged that earlier Art. VIII, 5 3 cases were
correctly decided even where urgency was not a factor.47
For example, the Frazier court acknowledged that "expenses incurred in the repair and
improvement of existing facilities can qualify as ordinary and necessary expenses."48 Both of
the cases on which the Frazier court relied for that proposition, City ofPocatello v. Peterson and

Bd. of County Comm'rs of Twin Falls County v. Idaho Heath Facilities Authority, discuss the
role public safety plays in the analysis. However, neither case discussed any sort of urgency or
9 led to the Court's
emergency requiring that the expense be made in the designated ~ e a r . ~This
45

See City's Brief to the District Court at 5 III.C.3, pp. 39-40 (R. Vol. I1 at 572-73).

46

143 Idaho at 7, 137 P.3d at 394.

47

Id. at 6, 137 P.3d at 393 (affirming the holdings of City of Pocatello v. Peterson, 93 Idaho 774, 473 P.2d
644 (1970) and Bd ofCounfy Comm 'rs of Twin Falls Counfy v. Idaho Health Facilities Authority, 96 Idaho
498, 531. P.2d 588 (1974)).

48

Id (citing Idaho Health ~acilitiesAuthority, 96 Idaho 498, 531 P.2d 588 and Peterson, 93 Idaho 774, 473
P.2d 644).

49

See Peterson: 93 Idaho 774, 473 P.2d 644 and Idaho Health Facilities Authority, 96 Idaho 498, 531 P.2d
588.

acknowledgement in Fraziev that the urgency which it had associated with the necessary prong
was a malleable concept and that various factors-some
"immediacy" or "emergency"-may

of which have iiotliing to do with

satisfy the "necessary" prong of the proviso's test. "The

required urgency can result from a number of possible causes, such as threats to public safety,
the need for repairs, maintenance, or preservation of existing property, or a legal obligation to
make the expenditure without delay."50 It is important to note that the list of factors which the
Frazier court stated could stand in the place of urgency was illustrative, not exclusive. Thus,

after a case-by-case analysis focusing on the character of the proposed debt, courts may find that
other different factors can satisfy the necessary prong, urgency being but one of them.51
Nowhere during the constitutional convention did the Framers indicate that cxpenses
must be "urgent" in order to fall under the proviso. As noted above, the delegates gave examples
of the types of expenses they believed would fall under the proviso. While some expenses, such
as "any emergency" or repairing damaged ditches and watercourse^^^ do suggest that an e!ement
of urgency could be indicative of an ordinary and necessary expense, other examples the Framers
provided are absolutely devoid of any urgency whatsoever. Clearly the payment of "witness
fees," "mileage fees," and "the ordinary legitimate expenses of running county government" do
not convey a sense of urgency. Judge Claggett's comments to the Constitutional Convention
regarding "ordinary indebtedness" and "extraordinary expenses in the ordinary administration of
affairsn-both

of which are encompassed by the proviso clause-are

particularly instructive.53

50

Frazier, 143 Idaho at 6-7, 137 P.3d at 393-94 (emphasis added).

51

Id at 6, 137 P.3d at 393 ("expenses incurred in the repair and improvement of existing facilities can qualify
as ordinary and necessary under the proviso clause") (emphasis added).

52

See Hart, Supra, at 587 and 592.

53

Id at 588. Judge Claggett's comments indicate that the proviso clause covers expenditures which qualify
as "the ordinary general indebtedness which is incurred in the way of administration of county affairs." Id

Moreover, analyzing the proviso terms separately, as this Court has required,54 leads to the
conclusion that first one must evaluate the character of the obligation. As the City has argued
above, an expense may be considered "necessary" where the character of the obligation is such
that it arises in the ordinary administration of local government affairs-in

other words if it is

essential to the government's administration of its ordinary or customary functions.
The obligation at issue in Frazier involved a large-scale, capital project (i.e., "special
indebtedness"), an obligation that quite cleaily was not a customary, recurring'or core function
arising in the ordinary administration of the City ofBoise9saffairs. After analyzing the character
of the obligation in Frazier, this Court noted that such an obligation would only fall under the
proviso clause if there were an urgency for making the expense.55 In reaching its holding, the
Court specifically distinguished the Peterson and Idaho Health Facilities Authority cases by
noting that the character of the obligations in those cases was "necessary," within the meaning of
the proviso, because of the "impact on public safety."56 The obligation in Frazier did not arise
in the ordinary course of governmental affairs, it was not a repair or improvement to an existing
facility, it was not a response to a public health concern or public safety need, and it was not
urgent. Thus, based on the circulnstances of that case, the Court was correct to hold that the
obligation was not necessary under Art. VIII, $ 3 .

54

See, e . g , Asson v. City of Burley, 105 Idaho 432, 441, 670 P.2d 839, 848 (1983) ("We note at the outset
that this proviso consists of two requirements: (1) that the expense be ordinary and necessary, and (2) that it
be authorized by the general laws ofthe state.")

55

Frazier, 143 Idaho at 5,137 P.3d at 392
Id at 6, 137 P.3d at 393. See also Peterson, 93 Idaho 774, 473 P.2d 644 and Idaho Health Facilities
Authority, 96 Idaho 498, 531 P.2d 588. The Peterson court did not hold that the expansion of the airport
was "urgent." Rather it held that repairing airport facilities, which "have become obsolete and have ceased
to provide the necessary safety demanded by air travelers," was an ordinary and necessary expense, thus
obviating the need for a bond election. 93 Idaho at 778-79,473 P.2d at 648-49.

The City subinits that the specific holding of Frazier does not apply to circumstances
similar to the obligations under the Renewal Power Sales Agreement, where the character of the
debt is such that it arises in the ordinary administration of local government affairs. 57 Rather,
the Frazier's holding is applicable only in circumstances where a case-by-case analysis of the
character of the obligation shows that it is a large, capital project, is not a repair or improvement
to an existing facility, does not impact public health or safety, is not urgent, or meets a need that
can be satisfied by other 1neans.58

11.

THE CITY'S OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE RENEWAL POWERSALES AGREEMENTARE
ORDINARY
AND NECESSARY
EXPENSES
BECAUSETHEYARE ESSENTIAL
TO THECITY'S
ABILITYTO PROVIDE
RELIABLE, LOW-COSTELECTRICAL
SERVICE
- A FUNCTION
WHICH
ARISES M THE ORDINARY ADMIN~STRATION
OF THE CITY'S AFFAIRS.

A.

A FINDING
OF URGENCY IS NOTREQUIREDHERE
BECAUSE
THE OBLIGATIONS UNDER
TJfE RENEWAL POWER SALES
AGREEMENT ARISE IN THE ORDINARY ADMINISTRATION
OF LOCALGOVERNMENTAFFAIRS.

Purchases of cost-based power supplies under the Renewal Power Sales Agreement are
essential to the City's ability to provide its residents with reliable and affordable electricity.59
Simply because the power supplies to be acquired pursuant to the Renewal Power Sales
Agreement need not and will not be delivered or paid for immediately does not make such power

57

The City does not contend that merely because an expense is necessary or essential to fulfill a
governmental fui~ctionit will automatically fall under the proviso. In the Asson case, discussed below, the
court found that a city's participation in the construction of a nuclear power generating plant did not fall
within the proviso because they were not "ordinary" expenses where there was "a colossal undertaking,
fraught with financial risk." Thus, the proviso contains two checks on a municipality's ability to incur debt
without a vote: the expense must be "ordinary" andthe expense must also be "necessary."

58

See Frazier, 143 Idaho at 6, 137 P.3d at 393 (noting that the obligation in Frazier could not qualify as a
repair or improvement because "the expansion is so profound as to constitute an entirely new construction
in every meaningful sense").

59

See Affidavit of Jo A. Elg in Support of Petition for Judicial Confirmation dated March 13,2009 (the "Elg
Affmit") at p. 4,
8-9 (R. Vol. 11 at 518). See also Affidavit of Jacqueline Flowers in Support of
Petition for Judicial Confirmation dated March 12,2009 (the "Flowers Afiduvit") at pp. 3 and 10, nT 8 and
28 (R. Vol. I1 at 506 and 513), Elg Affidavit at pp. 7-10,
18-23 (R. Vol. I1 at 521-24) and the Report of
Mooney Consulting, dated November 25,2009 (the "Mooney Report"), at p. 27 (R. VoI. I at 62).
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acquisitions any less "necessary" to the City or its inhabitants. While the City has developed
local hydroelectric generating resources and has sought to develop additional thermal generating
sources to complement its hydroelectric supplies, the City depends lnaterially on wholesale
power supplies to meet the requirements of the customers served by the System. The provision
of reliable, low cost supplies of electricity to residential, commercial and industrial customers is
necessary to the City's ability to promote and protect the public welfare and the local econorny,
and thus is an expense that arises in the ordinary administration of local government affairs. The
Idaho Legislature recognized the vital role of reliable, cost effective and stable electrical energy
in our society when it enacted Idaho Code § 50-342A(1), to provide specific authority for
municipal utilities to enter into joint ownership arrangements for power projects. In enacting
that section, the Legislature found and determined that:
Securing long-term electric generation and transinission resources
at cost-based rates is essential to the ability of municipal utilities to
provide reliable and economic electric services at stable prices to
the consumers and coinmunities they serve and is essential to the
economy and the econornic development of their colnmunities and
to the public health, safety and welfare. 60
The purchase of wholesale power supplies is no different than providing water, sewer or
sanitation services, or any other routine "pay-as-you-go" expense associated with the regular
operation of municipal government and the fulfilling of duties that arise in the ordinary
administration of the City's affairs.61 It is every bit as essential to fulfilling the "ordinary
legitimate expenses of running [local] government" as the payment of the salaries of municipal

6O

Idaho Code 5 50-342A(1); see also Idaho Code $5 50-325 and 50-342fb)

61

in Asson v. City of Burley, the Supreme Court differentiated between true "power purchase contracts" and
other types of "long-term debt obligations" involving large, capital construction projects and suggested that
a bona-fide power purchase agreement would, by its very nature, be an ordinary and necessary municipal
expense. 105 Idaho 432,443,670 P.2d 839,850 (1983).

enlployees, the purchase of water for distribution to consumers, the removal of snow and ice on
public streets, and ensuring adequate police and fire protection.62
It is often in the best interest of a city to enter into multi-year contracts for regular and
recurring services that enable the city to perform basic govenunental services or fulfill statutory
duties. A multi-year contract often provides cost savings and reduced administrative costs. A
multi-year contract can provide stability and avoid payment of unnecessary administrative costs
associated with frequent supplier changes. Quite frequently, a multi-year franchise contract is
necessary to induce a franchisee to undertake significant capital expenditures in order to supply a
much needed commodity or service such as sanitation services or fire protection services.63
Cities in Idaho routinely enter into multi-year contracts for essential services such as
health insurance for municipal employees, maintenance and repair of public safety dispatch
equipment and computers, purchase of critical fuel supplies for public safety vehicles, provision
of sanitation collection services, and fire protection or police and public safety services. Even
janitorial service contracts sometimes require multi-year commitments in order to secure
economical or favorable terms. Idaho Falls has a three-year contract in place with the unions for
its electrical workers and firefighters, a two-year contract for health insurance for its employees
and a thirty-year contract with Bonneville for the transmission of power from the Federal Power
System to Idaho Falls Power. It also frequently enters into short term multi-year supplemental
power contracts as necessary to shape its electrical load and meet seasonal power demands. G4
62

Thomas, 33 Idaho 394, 195 P. 92; Loomis, 119 Idaho 434,807 P.2d 1272; Butler, 11 Idaho 393, 83 P. 234;
Hickey, 22 Idaho 41, 124 P. 280; Hanson, 92 Idaho 512,446 P.2d 634.

63

See e.g Plummer v. City ofFruitland> 140 Idaho 1, 7: 89 P.3d 841, 847 (2004) ("A solid waste supplier
needs a long-term commitment from its municipal customers so it can obtain financing which is necessary
to purchase the amount of equipment and type of equipment required to best service [its] citizens . . .")

64

As discussed in the Elg Affidavit and the Engineer's Report, Idaho Falls Power projects that its allocation
of power under the Renewal Power Sales Agreement will be approximately 3 aMW less than the System's
net power supply requirements. Thus, during the term of the Renewal Power Sales Agreement, the City will
stili need to execute agreements for supplemental power in order to meet the System's power requirements,

None of these multi-year contracts are considered "urgent," yet they are necessary within the
meaning of Art. VIII, $ 3. The payment obligations under these arrangements, as well as under
the Renewal Power Sales Agreement, are essential to the City's ability to perform the functions
which arise in the ordinary administration of the City's affairs, and any "indebtedness or
liability" they may create is an ordinary and necessary expense of the City within the meaning of
Art. VIII, $ 3.

The specific contractual terms for the sale of power by Bonneville under the Renewal
Power Sales Agreement make it clear that the Renewal Power Sales Agreement is a true service
contract for the purchase of power on a "pay-as-you-go" basis. Under the Renewal Power Sales
Agreement, Bonneville commits to sell and the City commits to purchase specified monthly
blocks of power (the "Block" power supply product) as well as a percentage of the actual output
of Bonneville's federal power system (the "Slice" power supply product).65 The City will
purchase this power as it would pay for purchases under any other service contract-by

inaking

monthly payments, in arrears, and only for power made available by Bonneville during the
preceding month.66

beyond the power supplied by Bonneville under the Renewal Power Sales Agreement. Those supplemental
power contracts will undoubtedly require multi-year commitments. Repetitive elections for the purpose of
submitting to the voters the question of entering into supplemental power purchase agreements would be
highly inefficient and costly, and would significantly hinder Idaho Falls Power's primary objectives of
facilitating maximum rate stability and maintaining low rates. Thus, the present case is important not only
to confirm the City's authority to enter into and perform the Renewal Power Sales Agreement, but also to
clarify the City's ability to purchase supplemental power supplies under "true" power purchase agreements
that extend beyond a single year. See discussion of the City's supplemental power needs in the City's Brief
to the District Court, at $ III.E.2, pp. 45-47 (R. Vol. I1 at 578-80).
65

Renewal Power Sales Agreement, $3.2.

See Elg Affidavit at pp. 11, 13 and 14, 71 28, 32 and 35 (R. Vol. I1 at 525, 527 and 528); see also $ 5 3.2
and 16.1 of the Renewal Power Sales Agreement (R. Vol I at 98 and 137). Bonneville's power supply
operation "makes available" power to the City by delivering it to the points of receipt under the City's firm

The Renewal Power Sales Agreement does not contain any provision unconditionally
obligating the City to make payments to Bonneville regardless of whether Bonneville delivers
any power (e g , a "Hell-or-High-Water" provision, as was the case in Asson, discussed below).
While Section 3.2 of the Renewal Power Sales Agreement obligates the City to pay for power
that Bonneville in fact makes available regardless of whether the City elects to take delivery of
the power, this provision is tempered by the "Uncontrollable Force" provisions of the Renewal
Power Sales Agreement which excuses failures to perform by the City due to events beyond its
control, including specifically any failure ofthe facilities of the System that prevent Idaho Falls
Power from delivering power to its customers. The City is not required to make payments if
Bonneville does not make power available to the City.67
Under the Renewal Power Sales Agreement, the City will not issue bonds or other debt LO
fund its payment obligations, it will not be exposed to any construction risk and it will not
guarantee the debts or obligations of any third party. Bonneville has used the federal power
system--consisting of 3 1 federal hydroelectric projects and several non-federal hydroelectric and
thermal projects in the Pacific Northwest, representing 225 separate generating units (refened to
herein as the "Federal Power SystemJ')-to provide the City with reliable, low-cost power since

1963 and to other preference customers dating back to the 1930s. Bonneville is now committing
to use those same existing and operating power supply resources to serve the City with cost-

transmission contract with Bonneville's transmission operation under which power is transmitted to the
System. See Elg Affidavit at p.14,135 (R. Vol. I1 at 528).
67

There are, of course, certain risks inherent in purchasing power from Bonneville. For example, under the
"Slice" power supply product, Idaho Falls Power will pay a flat monthly fee for a specified percentage of
the output of the Federal Power System. The City's per-unit cost of power will be lower in high water
years when the Federal Power System produces more electricity, but will be higher in low water years
when production is reduced. However, there is no realistic possibility that the City will receive no power
under the "Slice" product - the Federal Power System includes dozens of generating projects and 225
separate generating units. all of which have operated reliably for many years. See Elg Affidavit at pp. 9-10
and 12-13, fl/22 and 28-30 (R Vol. I1 at 523-24 and 526-27).

based power for another seventeen years under the Renewal Power Sales Agreement. Under the
terms of the Renewal Power Sales Agreement, only the firm generation from the existing
resources of the Federal Power System is used to serve the City, and Bonneville has no statutory
authority to construct new facilities to provide this service.68
The Renewal Power Sales Agreement is analogous to other service contracts previously
upheld by the Idaho Supreme Court. For example, in Corum the Court determined that a
contract to hire a teacher and pay the teacher's monthly salary was, even though it extended
beyond the current annual budget, indeed an "ordinary and necessary expense" not subject to the
voting requirements of Art. VIII, § 3.69 Similarly, in Ray, the Court held that multi-year
enlployment contracts for school employees were "ordinary and necessaryq'within the meaning
of Art. VIII,

3

3, despite the fact that such contracts extended beyond a single budget year.70

The procurement of long-term power supply services to meet the needs of an existing and
operating municipal electric utility is no different than the procurement of the services of school
district employees on a multi-year basis.
Purchases of electric power supplies are just as necessary as other types of ordinarilyoccurring municipal expenses, such as the payment of city officials' and employees9 salaries,
which were upheld by the Court in Butler and Hickey as expenses that "clearly come within the
proviso."71 Such purchases are just as important as the continual payment of policemen
retirement benefits upheld in Hanson. And such purchases are just as essential as the ongoing
repair of municipal property upheld in Peterson and Hickey and the provision of municipal
services like snow and ice removal upheld in Thomas.
68

See Elg Affidavit at p. 9 , j 22 (R. Vol. II at 523); see aiso Mooney Report at p. 27 (R. Vol. 1at 62).

69

55 Idaho at 730,47 P.2d at 891.

70

120 Idaho at 120,814 P.2d at20.
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Butler, l l

Idaho at 404, 83 P. at 238.

These types of municipal expenditures, while they may obligate a city on a long-term
basis, are entirely different from the "special indebtedness" at issue in Frazier and other "capital
projects" cases, such as Dunbar, Bannock County and Asson. The obligations at issue in each of
these cases entailed financing the construction of new, large-scale capital projects---expenditures
certainly not regularly occurring in the ordinary administration of government affairs. In
contrast, expenditures incurred to pay for city and school district employee salaries and
retirement benefits, repairs to municipal property and general municipal services-including
power purchases by a municipal electric utility to provide electric services-dearly do not
involve financing capital projects. Rather, these are ongoing, regularly occurring municipal
expenditures for essential services. The Framers did not intend to subject these types of
necessary expenditures to a vote, and it would be absurd to do so. These types of expenditures
are simply "ordinary and necessary expenses" within the plain ineaning of those terms.
By executing the Renewal Power Sales Agreement the City has simply committed to
continue to pay for an ordinary and necessary expenditure that it already pays for and would
continue to pay for anyway. Tfthe City did not enter into the Renewal Power Sales Agreement,
it would still have to purchase its power supply needs from other sources (since it cannot
immediately acquire or construct a new generating facility).72 In this event, the City would
include the cost of power purchases in its annual budget every year, and pay for power as
services are received. As the District Court observed,
[a] contract to buy power in the future is simply a promise to
continue to pay for a municipal budgetary item in the future. In
other words, the City already pays for electrical power for its
residents. It shall continue to pay for electrical power for its
citizens in one form or another out of its annual budget. That the
particular form or [sic] electric power purchase before the Court
involves a substantial savings over a seventeen (17) year period
72

Elg Affidavit at p. 9, 21 (R. Voi. I1 at 523).

- 23 -

does not erase the fact that the City is not creating or incurring a
new debt, but paying for power from it [sic] annual budget. In so
doing, the City is capturing a significant savings by promising to
buy in the future, from Bonneville Power, an already budgeted
item.73
As discussed above, it is often in a city's best interest to execute a multi-year contract for
municipal services. In the case of the Renewal Power Sales Contract, however, it is absolutely
essential. Purchasing power on an annual or more frequent basis would subject the City to
significant market risk and price volatility. As discussed in the Mooney Report and the affidavits
of Idaho Falls Power management, the City has no meaningful alternative to the Renewal Power
Sales Agreement.74 In the absence of the Renewal Power Sales Agreement, the City would be
forced to obtain short-term power supplies in the wholesale market for most of the System's
requirements. The prices, terms and risks of wholesale market supplies are substantially less
advantageous to the City than the Renewal Power Sales Agreement and would expose Idaho
Falls Power and the consulners it serves to increased power supply costs, as well as unacceptable
price volatility and reliability risks.75
In summary, the Renewal Power Sales Agreement is a true service contract for essential
power supply services. It creates only a "pay-as-you-go" obligation of the City to pay for
services rendered. Accordingly, the Renewal Power Sales Agreement is clearly within the
established precedents of the Idaho Supreme Court for multi-year employment contracts and
other ordinarily and regularly-occurring municipal expenses.
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Order Granting Petition for Judicial Confirmation at 5 (emphasis added).

74

See Mooney Report at pp. 24-28 (R. Vol. 1 at 59-36), Elg Affidavit at pp. 7-10,¶¶18-23 (R. Vol. I1 at 52124) and Flowers Affidavit at p. 10, W 28-30 (R. Vol. I1 at 513).

75

Elg Affidavit at p. 9,7 19 (R. Vol. 11 at 523).

C.

TNE CITY'S OBLIGATiONS UNDER THE RENEWALPOWER SALES AGREEMENTARE
ORDINARYAND
NECESSARYEXPENSESUNDER ASSONV CITYOF BURLEY

Asson v City of Burley is the only decision of the Idaho Supreme Court applying Art.

VIII,

5

3 to a power purchase agreement and, prior to the Court's decision in Frazier, was

perhaps the leading case on the meaning of the proviso clause. Accordingly, a discussion of the

Asson case and a comparison of the City's payment obligations under the Renewal Power Sales
Agreement to the participants' agreement (the "Participants' Agreement") with the Washington
Public Power Supply System ("WPPSS") at issue in Asson is instructive in this case.76
In Asson, five Idaho cities that operate municipal eiectric utilities, together with dozens of
other utilities in the Pacific Northwest, executed the Participants' Agreement for the purchase of
"project capability" of two proposed nuclear power plants. Under the "dry hole" liability
provision of the Participants' Agreement, the participating utilities were unconditionally
obligated to pay their shares of debt service on all bonds issued by WPPSS to finance the plants,
regardless of the fact that construction of the plants might never be con~pletedand the
participants might never receive any e l e ~ t r i c i t y . ~After
~
issuing over $2 billion of bonds,
WPPSS could not obtain further financing, the nuclear power projects were terminated and
WPPSS proceeded to enforce the payment obligations of the participating utilities on the
outstanding Bonds. The Court in Asson found that the Participants' Agreement was void as to
the Idaho cities because no authorizing election had been held, the cities9 payment obligations
were not "ordinary" and they were "underwriting another entity's indebtedness in return for
merely the possibility of electricity."78

76

105 ldaho 432,670 P.2d 839.

77

Id. at 443,670 P.2d at 850.

78

id at 443,670 P.2d at 850.

In contrast to the WPPSS Participants' Agreement, the Renewal Power Saics Agreement
imposes no construction risk or "dry hole" liability upon the City. As discussed above, no debt
will be issued or incurred by Bonneville to finance the cost of new generating facilities to serve
the City under the Renewal Power Sales Agreement, and Bonneville has no statutory authority
Rather, only the existing and operating generating
whatsoever to undertake any such fa~ilities.~g
facilities of the Federal Power System will be used to serve the City and the City will, on a payas-you basis, purchase power, at Bonneviile's costs, from these facilities. Accordingly, the
Renewal Power Sales Agreement is a bona j d e services contract and the City's payment
obligations under it are ordinary and necessary expenses.
It cannot be emphasized enough that here, no new capital project is being financed-no
new courthouse as in Bannock County, bridge as in Dunbur, nuclear power plant as in Asson or
parking garage as in Frazier.80 The Renewal Power Sales Agreement is simply a true, "pay-asyou-go" service contract. Thus, unlike the agreements at issue in Asson, in this case the
obligations encompassed within Renewal Power Sales Agreement are both ordinary and
necessary. They do not constitute special indebtedness. Rather, these obligations are expenses
which arise in the ordinary administration of local government affairs.
111.

THE CITY'S OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE RENEWALPOWERSALESAGREEMENT
ARE
ORDINARY
AND NECESSARY
BECAUSE
THE PROVISION
OF ELECTRICITY
IS A DUTYTHE
CITYIS LEGALLY
OBLIGATED
TO PERFORM.
The District Court determined that because the City has a legal obligation to provide its

residents with electricity, the City's payment obligations under the Renewal Power Sales

79

See Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. g 791a, erseq.

80

See

5 I.c,supra.

Agreement are expenses the City is legally obligated to perform "promptly," thus satisfying the
"urgency" component of Frazier.81
The City contends that the District Court was correct in finding that the City has a legal
duty to provide power to its citizens, although for different reasons than those cited by the
District Court. S2 The City acknowledges that the Mayor is correct in his assertion that the City
is not a "public utility" within the meaning of Idaho Code

9 61-302.83

Nevertheless, the City

asserts that the District Court correctly found that "the expense of providing electrical power to
its citizens is a duty the City is legally obligated to perform."84 Under the Idaho statutory
framework, cities are authorized to construct, own and operate electric generating and
transmission facilities. Once they choose to exercise that authority, they assume a legal duty to
their citizens to supply electrical energy for the health, welfare, and benefit of their citizens. It is
that legal duty, assumed by the City, which supports the District Court's conclusion that
obligations evidenced by the Renewal Power Sales Agreements were necessary expenses within
the meaning of Art. VIII,

9 3.

Thus, this Court can uphold the District Court's decision, albeit

applying a different statutory framework than was used by the District C o w below.
Idaho cities may assume a duty to provide or cause to be provided necessary utility
services, including electricity, to their inhabitants. This duty was recognized in Alpert v. Boise
Water Corp., where the Court recognized that Idaho cities are authorized to either provide utility
services directly to their residents or grant a franchise to other entities to provide the necessary
8'

See Order Granting Petition for Judicial Confirmation at 10-11 (R. Vol. I1 at 620-21).

82

It has long been held by Idaho courts that a determination of a lower court may be affirmed on alternate
grounds. See, e.g., BECO Const. Co.. Inc. v. J-U-B Engineers, Inc., 145 Idaho 7 19, 724, 184 P.3d 844, 849
(2008) (quoting J R . Simplot Co., Inc. v. Idaho State Tar Comm'n, 120 Idaho 849, 853, 820 P.2d 1206,
1210 (1991).

83

Appellant's Brief at 7-8.

84

Order Granting Petition for Judicial Confirmation at 10 (R. Vol. I1 at 620).

utility services.85 Specifically, the Court spelled out the duty of a city, once it elects to provide
utility services:
It is the duty of the municipality to light its public streets and to
furnish its inhabitants with tlie means of obtaining gas at their own
expense, and having the power by legislative grant to erect and
maintain gasworks for that purpose, it necessarily follows that it
had the implied power to contract with others to furnish it in like
manner. . "86
Wl~erea niunicipality has undertaken to provide essential electric utility services directly
to its inhabitants pursuant to Idaho Code

5

50-325, the municipality has a duty to continue to

provide electric utility services at reasonable rates. That duty has been recognized by the Idaho
Legislature, first, in Idaho Code

5 50-325 which authorizes judicial review of municipal electric

utility rates. Additionally, Idaho Code

3

50-326 prohibits a city that owns an electric power

plant or transmission and distribution system from selling or leasing the same before the question
has been submitted to the taxpayers at a special election - thus, by inference, recognizing that a
city may not abandon its assumed duty without a public referendum approving such course of
action. Finally, Idaho Code

$9

50-325 and 50-327 prohibit a city which operates a power plant

from selling power that is not "excess power," defined as power that is not needed by the city or
its inhabitants. These sections are indicative of the essentiality of electricity to a city's residents
and support the imposition of a binding duty to provide necessary electric services at reasonable
prices to its customers, once a municipality elects to assume the role of a municipal utility
provider.

85

118 Idaho 136, 141, 795 P.2d 298, 303 (1990). Specifically with respect to the provision of electricity, the
Alperr decision recognized cities must provide the necessary services pursuant to the authority granted in
Idaho Code 5; 50-325, or else cause the services to be provided pursuant to a grant of franchise authority
pursuant to Idaho Code $5 50-329 through 50-330. Id

year utility contracts are 'expenses the [City] . . . was legally obligated to perform promptly."'90
As the statutory framework cited above indicates, the City has assumed a legal duty to continue
to provide electric power at reasonable rates, and that duty is satisfied by City's prompt
assumption of the obligations imposed by the Renewal Power Sales Agreement.
Although the District Court premised its decision upon a finding that the City's
obligations under Renewal Power Sales Agreement were in performance of a legal duty to
supply essential utility services, nevertheless, this Court should also find that those obligations
are ordinary and necessary expenses because by their nature they are essential to the performance
of a usual or customary governmental function. Accordingly, this Court may affirm the District
Court's conclusion on alternate grounds.

IV.

BECAUSE
THE CITY'SOBLIGATlONS UNDER THE RENEWAL
POWERSALESAGREEMENT
ARE
ORDMARYAND NECESSARY.
THE CITY'SOBLIGATIONS UNDER THE CREDITWORTHINESS
AGREEMENT
ARE ALSOORDINARY AND NECESSARY.
The City, like all of Bonneville's preference customers who will purchase the Slice

product under their renewal power sales agreements beginning in 201 1, was required to enter
into a Creditworthiness Agreement with Bonneville. Under the Creditworthiness Agreement,
upon the occurrence of certain events Bonneville may in the future require the City to post cash
collateral or a letter of credit issued by a commercial bank to secure its payment obligations
under the Renewal Power Sales Agreement. The cash or letter of credit is required to be in an
amount equal to 12% of the City's total annual power payments to Bonneville. If Idaho Falls
Power fails to pay a power bill under the Renewal Power Sales Agreement, Bonneville would
have the right to draw on the cash or the letter of credit to satisfy the unpaid amount.
Idaho case law is very clear that the Creditworthiness Agreement does not create a new
or separate obligation apart from the Renewal Power Sales Agreement. In Butler, the City of
90

Id at 10 (R. Vol. I!. at 620).

The duty of a municipal electric utility to continuously provide electric services is further
imposed by Idaho Code S; 50-302, which requires a municipality to act for the general welfare of
its inhabitants.87 Where electricity is so essential and necessary to the public health, safety and
welfare in our modern world-indeed,

without electricity, businesses, households, govenment

and essential facilities (such as hospitals) simply could not function-it

cannot be asserted that a

municipal electric utility has any lesser duty than that of an investor-owned public utility to
continually provide its customers with essential electricity at reasonable rates, once it assumes
the role of a municipal provider.8s In sum, the duty of a municipal electric utility to provide
electricity is, for all practical purposes, comparable to that of a "public utility" under the Idaho
Public Utilities Law. For purposes of Art. VIII,

5 3, that duty amounts to a legal obligation that

must be performed promptly (and continuously) by the City.
The District Courl held that the City's obligations under the Renewal Power Sales
. ~ ~noted above, the
Agreement were necessary by analyzing those obligations under F r a ~ i e r As
City does not believe that Fraziev's analytical framework is applicable to the type of obligations
at issue in this case. Nevertheless, assuming arguendo, that the District Court was correct in
applying Frazier to the instant case, the District Court was correct in holding that the obligations
under the Renewal Power Supply Contract were "necessary" under Frazier because the "multi-
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Idaho Code
50-302 states, "Cities shall make all such ordinances, bylaws, rules, regulations and
resolutions not inconsistent with the laws of the state of Idaho as may be expedient, in addition to the
special powers in this act [Title SO] granted, to maintain the peace, good government and welfare of the
corporation and its trade, commerce and industry." (Emphasis added)
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The Idaho Legislature has recognized the essential nature of affordable electricity to the public health,
safety and welfare in authorizing municipal electric utilities to participate in joint electric generation and
transmission projects in Idaho Code 5 50-342A, wherein the Legislature declared that "securing long-term
electric generation and transmission resources at cost-based rates ... is essential to the economy and the
economic development of [municipal] communities and to the public health, safety and welfare."

89

Order Granting Petition for Judicial Confirmation at 9-1 1 (R. Vol. 11. at 619-21).

Lewiston issued warrants to pay for certain municipal expenses, including the salaries of city
officers and enlployees and a tort judgment against the city, and subsequently determined to
issue bonds to fund the warrants. The Court determined that "[tlhe bonds proposed to be issued
are to be issued for the purpose of funding the outstanding warrant indebtedness of the city.
Such bonds will not increase the legal indebtedness of the city, but simply change the form of
existing indebtedness from warrant to bond. . . The question arises, then, whether the warrant
indebtedness which is sought to be changed to bonded indebtedness arose from the ordinary and
necessary expenses authorized by the general laws of the state."91 After an examination of the
expenses funded with the warrants, the Court held that these were "ordinary and necessary
expenses" within the meaning of Art. VIII,

5 3, and that the funding bonds were validly issued

without the need for an authorizing election.92
Similarly, in Hickey, the City of Nampa proposed to issue bonds to fund warrant
indebtedness previously incurred to pay for repairs and replacements to the city's water system,
salaries of city officers, firefighting equipment and other "necessary expenditures in the
maintenance of the municipal government."93 The Court held that these expenditures were
"ordinary and necessary expenses" within the meaning of Art. VIII,

3 3, and that the bonds were

treated as a continuation of the original "ordinary and necessary expense" represented by the
warrants. The Court stated:
Having determined that the indebtedness for which the warrants
were issued is lawful, and that the warrants are binding and valid
obligations of the city, it follows ... that the council might
authorize and issue funding bonds without submitting the question
to a vote of the people. This was not the creation of any new
91

11 Idaho at 403-04,83 P. at 238.

92

Id.

93

22 Idaho at 43,124 P. at 280

indebtedness, but was rather the changing of the form of the
indebtedness, or paying an ordinary debt already incurred.94
Applying the decisions of the Supreme Court in Butler and Hickey, if the amounts
payable by the City under the Renewal Power Sales Agreement constitute "ordinary and
necessary expenses" then the amounts posted or paid by the City under the Creditworthiness
Agreement, whether as a posting of cash and replenishment of amounts drawn or a posting of a
letter of credit and reimbursement to the bank of amounts drawn, must also constitute "ordinary
and necessary expenses". No new obligation of the City is created under the Creditworthiness
Agreement, rather, there is merely a change in form of the City's original obligation under the
Renewal Power Sales Agreement which itself was an "ordinary and necessary expense". This is,
in substance, identical to the issuance of bonds to fund warrant indebtedness, where the warrants
are redeemed and the city's original obligation takes the form of repayment to the bond holders.
CONCLUSION

The City's obligations under the Renewal Power Sales Agreement are ordinary and
necessary expenses within the meaning of Art. VIII,

5 3.

The drafters of the Idaho Constitution

intended that municipal governments be able to incur ordinary indebtedness without an
authorizing election. The proceedings and debates of the Framers of the Idaho Constitution, and
the holdings of Idaho cases interpreting the proviso clause of Art. VIII,

5 3 show that it is the

character of the obligation that determines whether it is ordinary and necessary. Idaho case law
also makes it clear that an expense is "necessary" within the meaning of the proviso clause where
it is essential to fulfill a local government's customary, regular or recurring functions. The
provision of reliable, affordable electric utility services is a duty the City is practically and
legally obligated lo perform. The City's obligations under the Renewal Power Sales Agreement
arise in the ordinary administration of local government affairs because they are essential to the
94

Id. at 46, 124 P. at 281.

City's ability to provide reliable, cost-efficient resources to residents of the City. Consequently,
the City's obligations under the Renewal Power Sales Agreement are "necessary" within the
meaning and intent of Art. VIII, § 3 even though no "urgency" exists.
Because the City's payment obligations under the Renewal Power Sales Agreement are
"ordinary and necessary expenses," it follows that any obligations the City would incur under the
Creditworthiness Agreement are also "ordinary and necessary." No new obligation of the City is
created under the Creditworthiness Agreemenr, rather, there is merely a change in form of the
original obligation which itself is an "ordinary and necessary expense."
This Court should affirm the decision of the District Court.
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